With the increasing complexity and dynamics of database and information systems, it becomes more and more di cult for administrative personnel to identify, specify and enforce security policies that govern against the misuse of data. Often security policies are not known, too imprecise or simply have been disabled because of changing requirements.
Introduction
A major obstacle in securing todays information systems is not the lack of appropriate security mechanisms, but the lack of methods and concepts that allow security administrators to identify and implement diverse types of security policies. Mandatory and discretionary access control mechanisms (e.g., BLP73, Bib77, Dio81, HRU76]) as well as extensions of these security models to database systems (e.g., Den86, JS90, SW92]) are well-known and understood concepts that help to ensure the availability, con dentiality, and integrity of data CFMS95]. In practice, however, for an information system and associated applications, often only a very few policies are known at system design-time. Furthermore, there are circumstances at system run-time when existing security policies need to be modi ed or new policies need to be added. In such cases, determining appropriate policy modi cations is based on what is known about the normal behavior of the users operating on the system. This is in particular true for database systems (DBS) when the database schema is modi ed in order to accommodate new or changing applications accessing the database. What is needed are concepts and tools that help administrators not only in identifying security policies of interest, but also in verifying and strengthening existing security policies. Recently several proposals have been made to discover user pro les and data access patterns in particular from audit logs generated by information systems (see, e.g., BBK99, CGL99b, CGL99a, FP96, LSM98, MGJ99, Sil99]). Pro les describe the normal behavior of a user or user group regarding the usage of the system and associated applications. Discovered pro les can be used to derive specications (and eventually implementations) of security enforcing mechanisms based on, e.g., an access control model. Although these approaches provide a valuable tool for administrators in identifying and verifying security policies, there is a major problem with these approaches and systems. Despite the usage of domain knowledge, e.g., in terms of a database schema CGL99b, CGL99a], a pro ler employed for the discovery of policies typically computes too many ne-grained policies. This is in particular true for complex database systems where users access a variety of data from many di erent relations. Administrators typically do not want to deal with hundreds of (closely related) access patterns, but prefer a representation of access patterns at an abstract, more generalized level of description. Without appropriate discovery methods that can deal with such (user-de ned) multiple levels of abstraction, existing techniques put the burden on administrators to identify related policies and generalize discovered policies into enforcing mechanisms that can be implemented e ciently. In this paper we describe an approach that tries to alleviate the above shortcoming of existing methods by a user-guided discovery of security policies at di erent levels of detail. The proposed approach is applicable to database systems as well as Web-based information systems, provided that these systems can collect su cient audit data. For our approach, we employ concept hierarchies introduced in CCH91]. Such hierarchies basically describe properties (values) of data at di erent levels of granularity, similar to generalization/specialization hierarchies. We propose an extension of the concept hierarchy framework in which we organize feature/value pairs (representing concepts) in trees. Also, instead of considering one concept hierarchy only, our pro ler considers multiple concept hierarchies in discovering pro les. Concepts modeled in such hierarchies eventually build descriptive parts of user pro les and thus security policies at di erent levels of detail. For example, rather than to derive several pro les that describe at which particular time in the morning a user accesses particular objects (e.g., relations), concepts hierarchies {used in an appropriate algorithm{ can be used to generalize many of such ne grained pro les into a general, more abstract pro le and policy. Abstract policies are not only easier to understand but also easier to map to enforcing mechanisms. Depending on the security policies to discover or verify, the administrator can choose among (combinations of) concept hierarchies and abstract concepts (features) embedded in these hierarchies. The proposed approach provides a valuable tool for security re-engineering in that it can be applied to audit logs generated by an information system at run-time. Another important feature of our approach is that we consider multiple concept hierarchies at the same time. Such hierarchies are either provided by the administrator (thus representing some kind of domain knowledge) or can be discovered using data using clustering techniques (see, e.g., Eve73, HF94] ). Finally, and most importantly, we introduce the notion of interestingness measure to determine the relevance of feature sets in the discovery process. This measurement can be speci ed by the administrator depending on the type and granularity of policy s/he is interested in.
Related Work
Basic user pro ling methods based on data mining and knowledge discovery techniques have been discussed in BBK99, FP96, LSM98, MGJ99, Sil99]. Though the proposed approaches provide an important rst step towards the discovery of pro les and policies, in practice, however, it turns out that the ability to incorporate application speci c domain knowledge is critical to the success and usability of these approaches. In CGL99b, CGL99a] we have shown how misuse detection, based on data mining techniques, can bene t from domain knowledge that is incorporated into applications associated with an information system. In particular, we have shown how a pro ler can be guided by using application speci c knowledge embedded in a database schema. We used sets of feature/value pairs, called itemsets, to describe the usage patterns of relations and attributes in a database. As mentioned above, even these approaches turn out to generate too many ne-grained pro les and policies to be useful in complex information system scenarios. Multiple concept hierarchies have been introduced in the data mining domain for deriving typical patterns of data at di erent levels of abstraction CCH91, HF94, HF95, SA95]. In the approach described in this paper, we extend the usage of multiple concept hierarchies in several ways. First, we allow di erent types of concepts in a single hierarchy, thus allowing administrators to embed knowledge in a more natural and intuitive way. Second, our framework is more general than HF95] in that it does not impose an arbitrary partial order on the attributes (concepts) in a concept hierarchy. Finally, we introduce the notion of interestingness measure as an important means for administrators to guide the pro le and policy discovery process.
Working Assumptions
In the remainder of the paper we assume an information system architecture capable of recording audit data, representing di erent access features, in an audit log implemented as relations associated with a database system. Attributes of the audit log are the features audited and their values. Hence, a tuple in the audit log can be viewed as a set of feature/value pairs, called itemset, and a relation as a set of itemsets. Features to be audited by the system are determined by the administrator prior to the user-pro ling and policy discovery. For example, the selection of features to audit depends on whether security policies regarding speci c users or speci c data objects (e.g., relations, data or Web-pages) are of interest. We also assume that audit records are grouped into an audit session which speci es a set of audit records that all share the same property (feature values). For example, an audit session might contain all audit records that correspond to audited actions performed by a particular user or against particular data objects. The administrator is responsible for specifying grouping criteria for an audit session, depending on the pro le and security policy s/he is interested in.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the basic idea and notions underlying concept hierarchies. In particular, we introduce the idea of measuring sets of features regarding whether or not they are of interest for policy discovery. In Section 3, we outline the basic data structures and algorithms underlying our pro ler for the discovery of security policies. In Section 4, we demonstrate the feasibility and e ectiveness of the presented approach for a Web-based information system.
Concept Hierarchies
Concept hierarchies represent application speci c domain knowledge about features of interest for the discovery and veri cation of security policies. Starting from auditable features, a concept hierarchy can be developed bottom-up by the administrator or data clustering techniques. In this section we formally introduce the notion of concept hierarchies. In Section 2.1, we describe the basic properties of concept hierarchies and how they organize feature/value pairs in form of trees. In Section 2.2, we discuss an evaluation framework to determine whether a given itemset, consisting of several feature/value pairs, is of interest. Section 2.3 outlines the usage of concept hierarchies for generalizing itemsets.
Preliminaries
Objects and data are conceptualized through feature/value pairs in which a feature is an object property and the value is the value of the property. A feature/value pair is denoted by hF = fi, meaning that the value of feature F is f. We use trees to model concept hierarchies organizing objects and data through feature/value pairs into di erent levels of abstraction. Each node in the tree corresponds to a feature/value pair. The root of the tree is a special node including all concepts. While such a framework for a concept hierarchy is simple and intuitive, it captures many real world examples. It is worth mentioning that a concept hierarchy is not limited to only one type of feature. Features can be abstracted to other features. Figure 1 shows a concept hierarchy for the concept time, a feature that often is of interest in pro ling. Note that with respect to using concept hierarchies for pro ling and policy discovery, leaf nodes represent auditable features (\raw data" in the audit log), whereas inner nodes represent generalizations of these features at multiple levels. Formally, a concept hierarchy is a tree such that nodes are labeled with feature/value pairs. A subtree with root hF =fi, having n subtrees rooted with hF i =f i i; 1 i n, is denoted by T(F = f) := (hF =fi; T(hF 1 =f 1 i); : : : ; T(hF n =f n i)) Let T be a set of concept hierarchies. Parent(n; T) denotes the parent node of node n in tree T and Desc(n) denotes the set of nodes that are descendants of n in T 2 T . The depth of a node n in T, denoted by Depth(n; T), is the number of nodes on the path from the root to n. The depth of the root node is 0. The depth of T, denoted by Depth(T), is the maximum depth of all nodes in the tree. We say a feature/value pair hF i = f i i may be generalized to hF j = f j i with respect to a hierarchy T if hF j = f j i is an ancestor of hF i = f i i in T. Since F j may be di erent from F i , a feature may be generalized to another feature, e.g., a di erent type of concept, as indicated in Figure 1 , where the feature hour has been generalized to the feature time.
Interestingness Measure
For computing user pro les based on concept hierarchies, it is important to determine whether a set of feature/value pairs might be of interest and is likely to lead to useful information regarding the usage patterns an administrator is interested in. As a novelty to using concept hierarchies, we introduce the notion of interestingness measure to guide the discovery of interesting patterns in an audit session containing a set of itemsets. In particular, we consider four aspects, (1) support, (2) depth, (3) distance, and (4) size of itemsets that describe sets of feature/value pairs.
(1) Support The support of an itemset gives a measure of how frequent that itemset occurs in an audit session. The higher the support of an itemset, the more regular is the pattern in the audit In case of an audit session with only a few di erent feature/value pairs, the support of an itemset can be normalized by the largest support of itemsets consisting of only one feature/value pair.
(2) Depth We prefer feature/value pairs of lower level of abstraction since they are more specialized and convey more detailed information (compare the features hour and time in Figure 1 ). This is captured by the depth of an itemset and describes the depths of its feature/value pairs in a set of concept hierarchies.
Let T hF= f i be the set of concept hierarchies that contain the feature/value pair hF =fi. The depth of hF =fi with respect to T is de ned as:
Depth(hF =fi) := Intuitively, the depth of a feature/value pair hF =fi is its average depth among all concept hierarchies that contain hF = fi as a node. The depth of an itemset I is the average depths of its feature/value pairs:
Depth(I) := 1 j I j hF= f i2I Depth(hF =fi); 2 R 0; 1] (3) Distance We conjecture that usage patterns of applications and users typically involve feature/value pairs that are semantically related. That is, users typically access information from the system that is semantically related. Whether and how information is related is some kind of domain speci c knowledge that often can be obtained from the information structures underlying the application, in particular the information schemas. Below we give some examples of distance measures, based on two di erent types of information systems. In Web-based information systems, web pages are naturally organized in a tree-like structure (assuming that web pages are not automatically generated upon user requests). Audit data recorded in a Web access log then typically record diverse features, including the IP Address (called src) of the requesting system, the URL (rsc) of a requested page, and the time of request (time). Such features can be organized into one or more hierarchies as well.
For example, the feature/value pair hsrc = www:bases:mili can be considered as the parent of the feature/value pair hsrc = www:ca:bases:mili and so on, the feature/value pair hrsc = =personneli is parent of hrsc = =personnel=scotti etc. The distance between two feature/value pairs can be de ned based on their location in a concept hierarchy. Consider, for example, the three feature/value pairs fv 1 hrsc = =personnel=scott=documentsi, fv 2 hrsc = =personnel=scott=schedulesi, and fv 3 hrsc = =personnel=jones=reportsi. fv 1 and fv 2 are more related than fv 1 and fv 3 or fv 2 and fv 3 because fv 1 and fv 2 share a longer common path in the hierarchy. Therefore, a way to de ne the distance measure between two feature/value pairs in the same concept hierarchy T is It states that the higher the depth of the least common ancestor of two feature/value pairs (and the longer is their common path), the smaller is the distance measure, i.e. they are more related. The distance measure of two of feature/value pairs with respect to a set of concept hierarchies can be taken as their average distance measure among those concept hierarchies that contain them, normalized by the number of concept hierarchies. Now consider a relational database system. Given the underlying database schema, attributes which either belong to the same relation or can be related by exploiting (a sequence of) foreign key dependencies are likely to be semantically related. In data retrieval statements, a user probably will not access attributes that are unrelated, that is, access patterns will be sets of semantically related attributes referenced together in a query or data modi cation statement.
Assume a database schema S consisting of a set of relation schemas R and a set of integrity constraints. The constraints considered here are primary and foreign key constraints imposed on relations in R. A relation schema R 2 R is a set of attributes, denoted by R = hA 1 ; :::; A n i. ShortestDist(R; S) computes the shortest distance between two relations R and S in the database schema based on primary and foreign keys by which R and S can be related. Given two attributes A i 2 R; A j 2 S (R; S 2 R), the pairwise schema distance between A i and A j , denoted by PSDist(A i ; A j ), is de ned as PSDist(A i ; A j ) := ShortestDist(R; S) maxfShortestDist(R k ; R l ) j R k ; R l 2 Rg Given a set of attributes fA 1 ; : : : ; A n g attributes(S), their distance is de ned as dist(A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) := maxfP SDist(A i ; A j ) j A i ; A j 2 fA 1 ; : : : ; A n gg We normalize the distance measure by the maximum shortest distance between any pair R k ; R l of relations in the database schema so that PSDist(A i ; A j ) 2 0; 1]. The closer the value of the distance measure to 0, the closer is the set of attributes. Attributes of the same relation have the distance 0.
Given an itemset I where the audited features include attributes referred to in queries and data modi cation statements. The distance of I then is the distance of the attributes referred to in I, that is, Dist(I) := dist(attributes(I)).
Size We prefer itemsets that contain more feature/value pairs since they reveal correlated information between di erent feature/value pairs. This is re ected by the size component of the interestingness measure. The size of an itemset is the number of feature/value pairs it contains.
Putting Things Together In sum, for the meaningful discovery of itemsets (and thus pro les and policies) we prefer itemsets that are more regular, more specialized, semantically closer and contain more feature/value pairs. Thus, the interestingness measure of an itemset should (1) increase with Di erent weights can be assigned to di erent components of the interestingness measure to ne-tune the pro ler to particular applications and policies of interest. For example, in an application where itemsets are sparse, the support of itemsets would be very small compared to others. A higher weight can be assigned to it to avoid bias towards other components. If an administrator is not interested in itemsets consisting of too few feature/value pairs, a higher weight can be assigned to size to guide the pro ler in discovering itemsets of larger size.
Generalization
An important feature of using concept hierarchies in multi-level policy discovery is the usage of the abstraction mechanism embedded in the hierarchies. For example, using concept hierarchies, access patterns of user can be generalized to access patterns of user groups, accessed objects can be generalized to classes of objects, depending on their attribute values, and so on. A feature/value pair hF = fi in an itemset I can be generalized to hF 
Algorithm
Based on the model and notions associated with concept hierarchies, in this section we describe an algorithm underlying the computation of itemsets using such hierarchies in a pro ler. In Section 3.1, we outline the basic underlying data structures for storing and managing itemsets. In Section 3.2, we describe the algorithm for computing interesting itemsets.
Audit Preprocessing and Data Structures
We assume that the auditing component associated with the information system records audit data in an audit log. A data preprocessor takes such audit records and stores them into audit sessions that are used by the pro ler. In particular, an audit session groups audit records according to one or more features (for example, all audit records associated with the actions performed by a particular user). All computations performed by the pro ler are based on the information stored in an audit session. The pro ler employs the query capabilities of the DBS that stores the audit data. In the following, we assume the following relations for recording audit and features/value data. The relation Audit (L1,l1,. ..,Ln,ln) stores sets of feature/value pairs (itemsets). Each itemset corresponds to an audit record from an audit session. The relations Lk (FIID,interest, sup 
Basic Algorithm
The method to compute interesting itemsets based on multiple concept hierarchies is divided into 6 steps, as described below (let n be the total number of features):
for k = 1 to n do
Step 0: check if we need to continue if k>1 and Lk is empty then break end if
Step 1: Generate and store itemsets of size k from itemsets of size k-1 Lk <-generateItemsets(k)
Step 2: Compute interestingness measure for each tuple in relation Lk
Step 3: Generalize itemsets based on concept hierarchies. In each iteration, itemsets which consist of feature/value pairs that are descendants of a feature/value pair afv (stands for AncestorFeatureValue pair) in the concept hierarchies are generalized if there is a gain in interestingness measure, i.e. by replacing those feature/value pairs by afv. The process is repeated until there is no gain in interestingness measure for all feature/value pairs in the concept hierarchies or until we have exhausted all feature/value pairs.
for each feature/value pair afv appearing in a set of concept hierarchies do generalizeToAFV(afv,Lk)
Step 4: Delete non-interesting itemsets from Lk
Step 5: Record interesting itemsets in relations F and FMaster end do;
Step 6: Prune non-minimal itemsets The basic algorithm for our pro ler proposed in CGL99b] consists of steps 1,2,4,5, and 6 only. This paper extends the approach in CGL99b] by adding Step 3 which generalizes feature/value pairs based on concept hierarchies.
Step 1 generates itemsets of size k from itemsets of size k ? 1. This is done by the apriori algorithm discussed in AS94].
Step 2 computes the interestingness measure of tuples in Lk by one scan over Lk. Step 3 generalizes all itemsets in Lk that have a gain in interestingness measure.
Step 4 prunes all itemsets from Lk that do not have a su cient interestingness measure.
Step 5 inserts all those interesting itemsets from Lk into relations FMaster and F. Itemsets that are subsets of other itemsets are deleted from FMaster and F in step 6. Readers are referred to CGL99b] for more details regarding steps 2, 4, 5 and 6. Due to space limitations, we will only brie y describe Step 3, which generalizes itemsets in Lk for possible feature/value pairs in concept hierarchies. The order of applying generalizeToAFV to what feature/value pair afv is unspeci ed. Procedure generalizeToAFV(afv,Lk) generalizes itemsets in Lk to feature/value pair afv (which stands for AncestorFeatureValue pair) if there is a gain in interestingness measure. First, all itemsets in Lk that consist of descendants of afv are copied to a temporary table Lgen. These feature/value pairs are replaced by their ancestor afv with the change in interestingness measure computed. Second, itemsets with a gain in interestingness measure are generalized in Lk by updating them according to Lgen. Since two or more feature/value pairs in an itemset may be generalized to afv, care is taken to remove redundant feature/value pairs in the generalized itemset. If afv is the root of the tree, the feature/value pair is dropped. Third, after Lk is generalized, there may be redundant itemsets which should be pruned. Redundant itemsets in Lk are discovered by an SQL query that stores pairs of FIID of itemsets with the same set of feature/value pairs in table FIIDpair. Redundant itemsets in Lk with FIID in FIIDpair are deleted except one itemset. If all the feature/value pairs of an itemset are generalized to the root node, the itemset is empty and is deleted. All the above computations are performed on tables using SQL statements and stored procedures.
Application to Security
In this section, we describe a feasibility study on extending the pro ler by concept hierarchies and compare its feasibility and e ectiveness with a pro ler not employing concept hierarchies based on three criteria. We then give some guidelines on how to convert pro les to policies and its usage in detecting misuse.
Feasibility Study Setup
We show the usefulness of our pro ler, called Pro lerCH (CH stands for Concept Hierarchy), with respect to policy veri cation and discovery by running it over a web audit log gathered at an institution which o ers online courses. Further, we illustrate the di erence of the pro les generated by using another pro ler, called Pro lerNoCH, which is based on the same technique, but does not consider concept hierarchies. The web audit log records the access patterns of users over four consecutive days. In particular, we consider three features in the audit log, src, rsc and hour. The feature src describes the IP address of the host requesting a web page, rsc describes the URL of the requested page, and hour describes the time a page has been requested. For the feature hour, we assume a concept hierarchy similar to the hierarchy shown in Figure 1 .
In order to discover itemsets of larger size, the notion of interestingness measure is ned-tuned by assigning weight 2 to the size component, i. For the audit session AuditSG, we only select audit records whose feature src corresponds to the domain(s) .sg and rsc to pages under /coursepages/ . We call the group of users accessing these pages from the domain .sg singapore. We evaluate Pro lerNoCH and Pro lerCH based on this audit session. In order to con rm that di erent user groups exhibit di erent usage patterns, we run Pro lerCH on another audit session, called AuditUIUC, which consists of audit records from the same audit log but whose feature values for src Coverage Relation profile1 shows that Pro lerNoCH discovers that requests often come from src=ce.singnet.com.sg and src=po.pacific.net.sg. The other selection criteria (values for rsc are under /coursepages/ ) are also covered by those itemsets involving rsc=/coursepages/ . However, the correlation that rsc=/coursepages/ is accessed from src= .sg is not discovered. This is because the data is sparse. Itemsets involving both rsc and src do not have high enough support and are pruned. This is, however, discovered by Pro lerCH as re ected in itemset 2-10. Pro lerCH discovers the selection criteria because data are aggregated into a higher level of abstraction based on the concept hierarchies. This makes the pattern more prominent and hence is discovered. In sum, both pro lers can discover the patterns used to select the data, whereas Pro lerCH does a better job.
Simplicity There is a total of 74 itemsets discovered by Pro lerNoCH. Those patterns are represented by only 11 itemsets discovered by Pro lerCH, which is a signi cant reduction. The concise pro le discovered by Pro lerCH helps the administrator in better understanding usage patterns of the user group singapore.
Novelty Pro lerNoCH discovers patterns that were not expected, namely users from user group singapore often access pages at hour=2,9,11,15. Also, user from po.pacific.net.sg often accesses web pages at hour=13. Similarly, Pro lerCH discovers patterns that were unknown before. For example, the hours of access are often TIME=noon, morning (covered by TIME=day) and TIME=midnight. Hence, the administrator can add a new security policy stating that users from the group singapore are allowed to access the web pages during the aforementioned hours. Alternatively, if someone from group singapore suddenly accesses the web pages at hour=evening, this may be suspicious. Further, Pro lerCH discovers that the resources that are most often accessed are actually /coursepages/plb105/ rice/tomato] and /coursepages/cantonese/current/. This can aid the administrator in re ning the security policy that users from group singapore can access resources /coursepages/ to a ner detail. Other novel patterns discovered include that users from group singapore often access the web pages during day time (TIME=day) and that pages accessed are likely to be /coursepages/plb105/ .
Inter-User Group Behavior The conjecture that users from di erent user groups exhibit di erent usage behavior is con rmed by comparing the pro les discovered by Pro lerCH on AuditSG and AuditUIUC. A comparison of the two pro les shows that users from group uiuc often access web pages during night (including midnight and late-night), afternoon and late-evening as opposed to day time by users from group singapore. This can be explained by the time zone di erence between the states and Singapore. Users from singapore often accesses resources under /coursepages/ while users from uiuc accesses /spep-95/. This is expected since these are the patterns extracted from the audit log.
Conversion of Pro les to Policies
We consider a policy to be an if-then statement describing a characteristic of a session, i.e., an interesting itemset in the pro le. Here we describe how to convert an interesting itemset into a policy. The criteria that aggregates audit records into an audit session gives the precondition of the policy. Feature/value pairs in the interesting itemset are literals in the consequent combined by 'and's. Care is taken to remove literals in the consequent that are logically implied by the precondition to avoid trivially true policies. In our previous example of AuditSG, the criteria to group audit records into AuditSG is src=*.sg and rsc=/coursepages/*. The policy for the interesting itemset frsc=/coursepages/, Anomalies can be detected by comparing the policies derived from a new session with the policies of the corresponding pro le(s). A policy from a new session whose precondition matches some policies, but its consequent matches none of these policies is a violating policy. Violating policies represent behavior departing from routines. A policy from a new session whose precondition matches none of the pro le policies is a new policy. New policies signal new usage patterns exhibited by the subject. High ratio of violating and new policies in a new session hints possible misuse of the system. We end this section with a remark on the run-time. We conducted experiments to evaluate the e ciency of the two pro lers. We tested it over a sequence of arbitrary audit sessions of increasing size. There is no evidence to show which pro ler is superior to the other with respect to the run-time. For Pro lerNoCH, the bottleneck lies in the computation of interestingness measure for the itemsets (
Step 2) because of the large number of itemsets generated. The time to compute the interestingness measure for Pro lerCH is smaller because di erent itemsets are generalized to the same itemsets and hence the total number of itemsets in the audit session is reduced. However, this comes at the cost of performing the generalization. In other words, the relative run-time of the two pro lers is data dependent.
To give the reader an idea of the order of magnitude of the run-time of the pro lers, we report that AuditSG contains 72 audit records (and hence 72*3=216 tuples in the audit session). It takes both pro lers approximately 1 minute to generate the pro les on a Pentium connecting to an Oracle8 database over 100Mbps LAN.
It would be useful if the system can automatically adjust and ne tune the parameters without human interference.
We also plan to automate the translation of pro les to policies and enforcing mechanisms. For example, in case of relational database systems, pro les can be converted to either appropriate user roles (with associated pro les) and user/application-speci c views on data. In particular, we plan to convert the output provided by our pro ler to pro le speci cation mechanisms as provided by, e.g., Oracle8 TH98].
